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Abstract
The Danish labour market has undergone a remarkable change during the 1990s with a
reduction of the unemployment rate from about 12 per cent in 1993 to less than 6 per cent at
the turn of the century. This reflects both a turn in the business cycle but also structural
changes related to shifts in labour market policies. The focus of labour market policies has
been changed from passive measures towards more active measures and there has also been
important changes in the unemployment insurance system.  This paper offers an overview of
the developments in the Danish labour market during the 1990s, and reviews the major policy
shifts, as well as possible explanations of the remarkable reduction in unemployment.
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1.  Introduction 
The Danish labour market has undergone a remarkable change during the 1990s. At the start of 
the decade the policy debate was still dominated by the concern of how to adapt to long-lasting 
unemployment, and policy initiatives were mainly passive in nature based on the view that 
there was an excess of labour supply relative to the job creation potential of the economy. By 
the turn of the century the debate is focused on how to expand labour supply so as to prevent 
overheating of the labour market and to prepare for the demographic changes which in the 
absence of reforms will lead to a decline in labour supply. The current policy debate is thus 
dominated by reform proposals to strengthen the incentives underlying labour supply in all its 
dimensions (hours, participation and retirement etc.).  
























Note: Number of unemployed as a percentage of the labour force 
Source: ADAM-databank, Statistics Denmark 
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As many European countries, Denmark experienced an increase in unemployment in the mid 
1970s. The tendency to increasing unemployment was interrupted in the mid 1980s during an 
upswing in the Danish economy, but it began to pick up again in the latter half of the 1980s. 
The unemployment problem has thus been persistent, and the registered unemployment rate 
peaked at 12% in 1993. Subsequently, it has been steadily decreasing, and currently the rate 
has been stable for a couple of years at a level slightly below 5%, cf. Figure 1. In early 2003 
there is some tendency to an increase in unemployment reflecting a less favourable business 
cycle situation. 
The development in unemployment has taken place against the background of quite different 
levels of nominal wage and price inflation, cf. Figure 2. During the late 1970s and the early 
1980s inflation was high, but a disinflationary policy initiated by the re-launch in 1982 of  a 
fixed exchange rate policy combined with a tight income policy brought inflation down. In 
recent years inflation has been stable at a level around 2-3%. It is particularly noteworthy, cf. 
Figure 2, that nominal wage increases have been stable over the period in which 
unemployment has been reduced. 
 
Figure 2: Wage and price increases 
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Source: ADAM-databank, Statistics Denmark 
 
Despite the substantial difference in nominal wage increases over the past decades real wages 
development has been fairly steady and the period since 1970 can in terms of real wage growth 
be divided into three periods. The period 1960-1975 had a real wage growth of 5.5%, from 
1976 to 1992 it was only 0.8%, and over the period 1993-2001 it has been 1.9%. It is worth 
noting that inequality in Denmark has been roughly unchanged over the period in which the 
unemployment rate has varied substantially (see Det Økonomiske Råd 2001). This can both be 
taken as a reflection of how the Danish welfare model works, and the political constraints 
which have been imposed on the policies pursued.  
The aim of this paper is to consider the reason for the sharp reduction in unemployment, and 
the fact that it has been possible to maintain a lower unemployment rate without inducing 
wage increases. To set the scene for the subsequent discussion of changes in the Danish labour 
market during the 1990s, it is useful to bring the development in perspective by briefly 
reviewing the developments and policy views prevailing in the past. From practically full   3 
employment during the 1960s unemployment rose to double digit figures in the mid 1970s and 
this situation turned out to be very persistent, cf. Figure 1. Various measures were launched 
during the late 1970s and early 1980s including devaluations and a twist strategy for aggregate 
demand management aiming at curtailing private demand and expanding public demand to 
direct demand towards domestic producers and thereby improving both the unemployment and 
the current account situation. However, this line of policy did not succeed in reducing the 
unemployment problem (nor any other major macroeconomic policy concern).  During the 
early 1980s there was a shift towards a fixed exchange rate policy accompanied by income 
policy and a tight fiscal policy (see Andersen (1994)). A hike in domestic demand initiated a 
boom which also brought unemployment down, cf. Figure 1. However, a wage hike in 1987 
(see figure 2a) suggested that structural problems prevented a lasting reduction in the 
unemployment rate, and subsequently the unemployment rate rose again. This started a seven-
year-long period with low growth and high and increasing unemployment, which was 
terminated by the policy shift in 1993/94 (see below). 
Throughout there has been broad political support to the view that the unemployment problem 
should not be solved by a retrenchment of welfare policies via reductions in unemployment 
benefits and social assistance. On the contrary, various policy initiatives have been taken to 
ensure income maintenance for the unemployed. As a consequence the rules for benefit 
duration were extended and participation in various so-called job-offer schemes could be used 
to re-qualify for unemployment benefits. Other measures were introduced to reduce labour 
supply, most important was the early retirement scheme launched in 1979. In the late 1980s 
and early 1990s an increasingly dominating view in the public debate was that “we have to 
learn to live with an excess of labour”.  
After a change in government in 1992 a new policy was launched which in retrospect can be 
interpreted as having followed a two-handed approach, although the policy strategy developed 
over time. Part of the shift was an expansionary fiscal policy to boost growth and pave the way 
for a reduction in unemployment. The other part was a shift in labour market policy which 
implied that more passive policies which had been pursued in the past were changed in a more 
active direction. In particular the incentive structure was changed, although there have been 
few direct cuts in transfer payments and the like (see below). 
With the outset in this background this paper attempts to provide an overview of the 
developments in the Danish labour market during the 1990s. It reviews the major policy shifts 
during the 1990s, and discusses possible explanations which have been offered of the 
remarkable reduction in unemployment.  
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a few facts on labour market 
developments in Denmark, and section 3 turns to a discussion of the role of business cycle and 
structural factors for unemployment. Section 4 offers a detailed discussion of labour market 
policies with particular focus on the implications of the shifts from passive to more active 
measures. Wage formation is addressed in section 5 which also considers the role of 
decentralization, mis-match and taxation. The implications of ageing and integration of 
immigrants for labour supply are briefly discussed in section 6, and section 7 gives a few 
concluding remarks. 
 
2.  A few facts 
 
The Danish labour market is characterized by a relatively high labour force participation rate 
(76% in 2001), and in particular the participation rate for women is high by international 
standards (71% in 2001). There has been a trend decline in the participation rate for men (it   4 
was 95% in 1950), and a trend increase for women until the early 1990s (reaching 72% in 
1990). Over the years there has been a trend decline in working hours (average working hours 
were above 2300 hours per year in 1950, and below 1700 in 2001), and the retirement age has 
also dropped (currently the average retirement age is about 61 years, whereas the official 
pension age is 65). 
Some summary statistics on the developments in the Danish labour market are given in Table 
1. It is seen that female and youth unemployment went up during the high unemployment 
period, which also had an increase in long-term unemployment in particular for unskilled. The 
reduction in unemployment has reversed these trends. 
 
Table 1: Key labour market facts 1970-2000 
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Notes:  a) Registered unemployed as share of labour force, b) age group 16-24 years, c) fraction of unemployment due to number of 
unemployed for at least 80% of the working year. 
Source: Danmarks Statistik 
 
In an extended welfare state as the Danish with strong universal elements in welfare policies it 
is important to consider the unemployment problem from two angles, namely, the number of 
people effectively available for the labour market, and the number of people relying on income 
transfers from the public. The two need not coincide since the use of passive measures in 
labour market policies may imply that those being entitled for welfare payments of one form or 
another are not necessarily available for the labour market.  Figure 3 shows that this distinction 
is not trivial for Denmark  since there has been a large and systematic difference between the 
two. The figure plots the registered unemployment rate as well as a measure for search 
unemployment (those actively searching for jobs and ready to work, cf. ILO definition) and a 
gross measure for unemployment (unemployed plus people in activation and early retirement 
schemes from unemployment). The figure brings out two important features. First, search 
unemployment has generally been below the registered unemployment rate suggesting that the 
latter does not provide a reliable indicator of the slack in the labour market, and that some are 
claiming unemployment benefits without being actively searching for jobs. Second, the gross 
unemployment rate is much larger than the registered rate indicating that the implications of 
unemployment for public finances are much larger than the official unemployment figures 
suggest. 
 
   5 
 
 
Figure 3: Search and gross unemployment 
 
 






















Source: Det Økonomiske Råd 
 
 
3.  Business Cycle vs Structural Components 
The development in the labour market during the 1990s has been accompanied by a business 
cycle upturn. The average growth rate for GDP in the period 1993-2001 was 2.5% while it 
only was 0.25% for the period 1987-1993 The level of unemployment prevailing in the early 
part of the 1990s undoubtedly had a non-trivial business cycle component, that is, it was to be 
expected that a turn in the business cycle would be able to reduce unemployment.  
However, structural improvements are also important. To see this it is interesting to compare 
the developments during the 1980s and the 1990s, which get close to a controlled experiment 
of the effects of substantial increases in aggregate demand
2. In the first part of the 1980s there 
was also a business cycle upturn, growth rates soared and unemployment started to fall. 
However, the upturn was constrained by labour shortage in specific areas and wage increases 
reached almost 9% in 1987 well beyond the level consistent with the fixed exchange rate 
policy. Since growth in domestic demand was high, there is no doubt that various supply 
constraints played a role. This is directly seen from the fact that import growth peaked and the 
current account turned into a record deficit of 5.3% of GDP in 1986. This suggested binding 
structural problems in the labour market preventing unemployment from falling below a level 
of 8-9%. However, during the recent upswing it has been possible to bring unemployment 
below this level without igniting wage increases. This indicates that structural unemployment 
has been reduced in the 1990s. 
                                                 
2 Both periods were characterized by substantial increases in domestic demand. The aggregate demand increase in 
the 1980s boom was slightly more rapid/strong than the one in the 1990s. However, the two periods also differ in a 
number of other respects including the current account position, public deficits, inflation etc. 
Registered unemployment 
“Search” unemployment 
Gross unemployment   6 
It is very difficult to disentangle the business cycle and the structural component in the 
reduction in unemployment for several reasons. First, the policy changes over the period can 
be interpreted as following a two-handed strategy involving both demand and supply 
measures. Initially the period was kicked off by an expansionary fiscal policy
3, and 
subsequently when unemployment started to decrease the labour market policy was in several 
steps tightened (see below). In political economy terms there is no doubt that these changes in 
labour market policy were only possible because unemployment was falling. The measures 
were motivated by the fact that it was possible to do something about the unemployment 
problem and that it was important not to repeat the experience from the mid 1980s.  
Various measures of the structural unemployment rate have been made (see e.g. 
Finansministeriet (2002a)). These measures suggest that structural unemployment peaked at 
11% in 1993 and subsequently fell to a level of 5-6%.  
In a recent estimate (Det Økonomiske Råd, 2002) it is suggested that the reduction in 
unemployment from 1993 to 2001 of 7 percentage points can be decomposed into 1-1.5 
percentage points due to passive measures transferring unemployed to other schemes (early 
retirement, paid leave schemes etc.), 2-3 percentage points can be attributed to the business 
cycle component, and 2-3 percentage points to structural improvements.  
However, it should be noted that measures of structural unemployment can be difficult to 
interpret. First, the estimated structural unemployment rates follow a smoothened version of 
the actual unemployment rate, and does not relate the changes to any underlying structural 
variables, i.e. the changes in the structural unemployment rate are basically unaccounted for. 
Second, it is very hard to envision structural changes of such strength that the structural 
unemployment rate went up by several percentage points from 1987 to 1990. The only possible 
candidate seems to be a depreciation of human capital, but it is hard to reconcile this 
explanation with the subsequent sharp reduction in unemployment. 
The presence of substantial business cycle components in the reduction in unemployment and 
the fact that unemployment has been persistently high suggest that the self-equilibrating 
mechanisms in the labour market work very sluggishly. Attempts to identify the persistence 
generation mechanisms suggest that substantial inertia is present in the adjustment process (see  
e.g. Andersen and Hylleberg (2000)). Both nominal and real sources of inertia are found to be 
important, but the former seems to be quantitatively most important. However, the adjustment 
failures are not strong enough to support the interpretation that the deteriorating labour market 
performance is due to a sequence of adverse shocks in combination with  substantial inertia.  
Accordingly, to account for the persistence of unemployment it is necessary to take structural 
factors into account. A pertinent question is whether the extended arrangements of the welfare 
state have been successful in ensuring a very high degree of income insurance (reflected in 
inequality being unaffected by the rise in unemployment), but at the cost of a worsening of the 





4.  Labour market policies 
During the 1990s a number of labour market reforms have been initiated. Whereas the initial 
phase was characterized by a continuation of passive policies via e.g. a paid leave scheme 
(later abolished), the policy gradually changed to put more emphasis on active measures with 
                                                 
3 Estimates of the expansionary effects of discretionary fiscal policy changes shows that it added about 0.7 
percentage point to growth in 1993 and 1994, Finansministeriet (2000).   7 
the specific aim of reducing the possibilities of passively claiming unemployment benefits, and 
to enhance the possibilities for unemployed to find regular jobs. 
 
 
4.1  Unemployment benefits 
 
The Danish unemployment insurance scheme is by international standards fairly generous. The 
average replacement ratio is some 60%, and the entitlement period has in the past – despite 
various statutory limits – effectively been open-ended, and eligibility could easily be obtained 
(via education or work for 6 months). The benefits are calculated as 90% of previous earnings, 
but there is a maximum benefit level (currently constituting about 50% of average pay for 
ordinary wage earners). This implies that the replacement rate is highest for low wage groups 
and declines with wage income. Membership of an unemployment insurance scheme is 
voluntary, and members pay a fixed contribution. Membership is therefore closely correlated 
with unemployment risk (see Parssons et al. (2002)). Marginal expenses in the unemployment 
insurance system are covered by the public sector implying that in periods with high 
unemployment the public financial contribution has been large. In the past there has been no 
severance pay in the Danish system. Denmark has therefore had an internationally high rate of 
short-term unemployment. Hiring and firing rules are flexible (Nicoletti et al. (2000)). 
A key political premise underlying the labour market reforms during the 1990s has been that 
there should be no direct  reductions in transfer payments. The political constraint has 
therefore been to improve the incentive structure without undertaking a retrenchment of key 
welfare state arrangements. Still substantial tightening of the unemployment scheme have been 
made, and the Danish case is thus interesting in showing a possible route for labour market 
reforms which does not jeopardize basic welfare state objectives. 
The duration of the entitlement period for unemployment benefits has been radically reduced. 
In 1993 the duration period was officially 7 years (although in practice it could be prolonged 
by participation in job-offer schemes), and in a sequence of reforms it has now been reduced to 
4 years, see Figure 3. At the same time passive collection of unemployment benefits is no 
longer possible. The current policy
4 is based on the so-called “rights and obligations” principle 
implying that individuals have a right to compensation for loss of income, but also an 
obligation to take action, at the same time society has an obligation in trying to improve the 
situation of the individual, and therefore a right to impose certain requirements for entitlement 
for benefits. The current scheme implies that the “passive” period on unemployment benefits 
cannot exceed one year, and that the “activation period” should be initiated no later than one 
year after having become unemployed, and constitute 75% of the unemployment benefit 
duration period. While maintaining the unemployment benefits unchanged, the introduction of 
such mandatory activation schemes has effectively influenced the incentives to search for 
regular jobs, and introduced obstacles to reduce misuse of the system (by e.g. voluntary 








                                                 
4 A recent reform has implied that the rules will be interpreted more flexible as of from July 2003, see also Figure 4.   8 
Figure 4  Changes in the unemployment system – benefit and 
”activation” period 
 
          pr.  1  July  2003     
          pr.  1  January  2001     
            Pr.  1  January  2000     
                pr.  1  January  1999    
                  pr.  1  January  1998   
                    pr.  1  January  1996 
                      pr.  1  Jan.  1994 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Year   
       Benefit  period     ”Active”  period     
Note:  The ”right and obligation principle” in the ”active” period was introduced in 1995. As of 2003 
there is no distinction between the passive benefit period and the activation period. 
Source Finansministeriet (1999), Arbejdsministeriet (2000) og BeskFftigelsesministeriet (2002). 
 
Entitlement to unemployment benefits now requires regular work of a duration of one year 
within the last three years (previously six months within the last three years). Importantly,  
participation in activation schemes does not qualify (since 1994) for renewed entitlement to 
unemployment benefits. If the benefit period expires without having found a regular job, the 
person will have to rely social benefits (means tested on the basis of among other things the 
family situation).While the unemployment benefits are flat during the unemployment period, the 
combination of the unemployment benefit scheme and social assistance implies that the 
individual faces a step-wise profile of compensation as illustrated in Figure 5. As of 1998 the 
“right and obligations” principle has also been extended to the social benefit scheme. It is readily 
seen from Figure 5 that the economic incentives for low income groups moving from 
unemployment to work are small (irrespective of whether unemployment benefits or social 
benefits are claimed), whereas the incentive for higher income groups is larger. Several studies 
have confirmed that for low income groups the economic incentive to work can be small or even 
absent (taking into account transport costs and child care), which is the net result of the taxation 
system (see below) and the design of the welfare system (See Finansministeriet (2002b) and 







Figure 5:   Duration dependence: Unemployment benefits and social assistance   9 




































Note: Calculation made for families with one child. 
Source: Det Økonomiske Råd (2002) 
 
 
Despite unchanged statutory benefit levels the unemployment insurance scheme has thus been 
tightened substantially. It is difficult to summarize the many dimensions and changes of the 
system in a single measure, but Figure 6 gives an indication of the changes made by 
considering the development in the replacement rate for an average worker with and without 
the reforms. Two things are noteworthy. First, there is a trend decline in the replacement rate 
for the average worker due to the upper limit on unemployment benefits (which has not been 
following the trend in average pay). Second, the shortening of the duration period and the fact 
that entitlement cannot be regained by participation in activation measures has implied a 
substantial decrease in the effective replacement rate. 
 






















After reform Without reform
 
Note: The figures show the replacement ratio for an average worker as the present value of unemployment benefits and social assistance over 
a 20 year horizon, i.e. the option value of unemployment benefits and social assistance relative to the present value of average pay. 
Source: Det Økonomiske Råd (2002) 
 
Since 1995 firms have been obliged to pay unemployment benefits for the first two days of an 
unemployment spell. The system with low hiring and firing costs gave firms and workers an   10 
incentive to exploit the unemployment insurance scheme in cases with short-run variations in 
labour demand. It is a fact that the incidence of short spells of unemployment is particularly  
high in Denmark, and that the re-employment propensity is high. Of those becoming 
unemployed in 1998 more than 40% were rehired by the same employer within a period of 26 
weeks (Det Økonomiske Råd (2002)). This is suggestive that employers can use the 
unemployment insurance system as a buffer to cope with temporary variations in the need for 
workers. 
There is one important exception to the rule that statutory benefit levels have not been 
changed, namely, the so-called “youth package” implemented in 1996. The reform was 
targeted persons below 25 and restricted the period for which unemployment benefits could be 
claimed to 6 months. This was a significant tightening since it previously was fairly easy to 
enter the unemployment insurance scheme by working 6 months and the unemployment 
compensation would exceed study support and wages in apprenticeships by a wide margin. 
The reform implies that an unemployed youth after the 6-month period would have to accept 
an education offer at 50% of unemployment benefits (equivalent to a study grant) (this scheme 
has been partially extended to all below 30 in the sense that in  education activation they are 
entitled to a study grant and not unemployment benefits). One outstanding fact concerning the 
development in unemployment is that youth unemployment has come down from a peak level 
of 16% to about 3 %. The reform has undoubtedly contributed to this development. 
 
4.2. Activation 
An essential ingredient of the labour market policy has been so-called activation measures. 
Whereas such measures have been part of the labour market policy since 1978 the main 
purpose has in the past effectively been to provide a scheme to make it possible to regain the 
right to unemployment benefits. With the labour market reforms in the mid 1990s the 
activation schemes became an integral part of the “right and obligation” principle – the society 
offers income compensation, and the individual has the obligation to participate in activations 
schemes – passive collection of unemployment benefits should be prevented. As not above, an 
important part of the reform was that participation in an activation activity would not qualify 
for a new spell on unemployment benefits. 
In principle one can think of various effects of activation. There is an incentive effect, since 
the value of unemployment benefits decreases when time consuming obligations are part of the 
package. This may induce some to search more actively for regular work (or give up work in 
the shadow economy), or leave the labour force because their value of leisure is high. This is a 
sorting effect implying that unemployment benefits become more targeted to those in real 
need. In principle this incentive or sorting effect could be achieved with any mandatory time 
consuming activity
5. However, if the job prospects of unemployed can be improved by 
participation in activation this is a potential important additional effect. This could work via 
both a motivation effect (participating in activities motivating people to get back to regular 
work, or give them the habit of regular activities and the self-confidence needed), or a 
qualification effect (providing skills needed to improve employment chances). However, 
participation in activation could also have a negative effect on job search, since people may 
search less actively while participating in such activities and this may create lock-in effects. 
Moreover participation in such schemes may affect the reservation requirements, e.g. by 
                                                 
5 It could be argued that the incentive effect could be strengthened by making the activation activities demanding 
but meaningless. However, this would not be possible given the political constraint of decency in the treatment of 
people.   11 
narrowing job search to jobs very narrowly linked to the type of training received during 
activation. 
The activation instrument has been extensively used since the policy reform made it an 
obligation to offer such an activation at a pre-determined timing, cf. above. The volume of 
activation has also been affected by the shortening of the “passive” unemployment benefit 
period which implied a forward move of the stock of people to be offered activation. Denmark 
has thus in international comparison used a substantial amount of resources on active labour 
market policies, cf. Figure 7. Expenses to active measures thus amount to about 1.5% of GDP 
and total labour market expenses peaked at almost 7% of GDP in 1993. 
 
 


























Active measures Passive measures
 
Note: Passive  measures include expenses to unemployment benefits. Active measures include administrative expenses. 
Source: OECD (2002) 
 
The types of activation used basically fall in three categories: private job offers, public job 
offers and educational activities. On average less than 10% of those in activation have been in 
private jobs offers, between 15 and 20% in public job offers and the remaining in various 
forms of educational and training activation. A number of analyses have recently been made of 
the effects of these various activation schemes (for an overview see Economic Council 2002). 
There is evidence in support of some motivation effect (the sorting effect is difficult to analyse 
empirically). However, for those being actually activated the improvements in labour market 
prospects are very small or even negative. Private job training in general improves job market 
prospects if employment can be gained at the workplace in which activation is taking place, 
but outside the specific firm this form of activation does not seem to improve labour market   12 
prospects. Public job training has been found to have a substantial lock-in effect, and no or 
even a negative qualification effect (possibly by affecting the reservation demands of 
unemployed). Educational activities have therefore implied some improvement in 
qualifications for women, skilled and old workers, but are also characterized by substantial 
lock-in effects. 
The dismissal effects of activation can have several causes. First, given the increased emphasis 
on activation and the forward shift in activation the system has been overloaded and “quantity” 
may have come to dominate “quality”, i.e. activation has become a routine and not a genuine 
attempt to identify the adequate activation for each single person. Second, although the 
empirical methods are designed so as to take account for sorting problems, it may empirically 
be difficult to fully control for sorting mechanisms working before the mandatory activation 
period is initiated, i.e. if those ending up in activation do so because they have low 
qualifications it is less surprising that their labour market prospects are also weak after 
activation.   
Another issue is the way in which the activation policies, and in particular educational 
activities have been implemented. Problems of low labour market qualification are unlikely to  
be solved by participation in education activities for which almost 40% have a duration of 
maximum 8 weeks. In net terms the activation scheme as it has been implemented offers 
relatively little value for money, and there is thus a need to reform the activation system (see 
Det Økonomiske Råd (2002)). 
  
5. Wage  formation 
 
The most visible indication that structural changes have taken place during the 1990s is the 
fact that unemployment has been reduced substantially without inducing a wage hike, cf. 
Figure 1. Accordingly, all macro-wage models have had difficulties in explaining wage 
developments during the latter part of the 1990s and they all predict wage increases in excess 
of what has been actually observed. Figure 8 shows this for a simple Phillips-curve, but the 
wage equations used in macroeconomic forecasting
6 (see Det Økonomiske Råd (2002)) all 
share this feature. 
Re-estimations extending the sample period thus tend to imply a reduction in the sensitivity of 
wages to unemployment, which is paradoxical since it should be expected that structural 
reforms would have implied the opposite. This finding may be the result of missing structural 
variables in such macro-wage equations, and thus a transitional phenomenon in a sample 
period in which wage increases are moderate and unemployment falling due to structural 
changes in the labour market. In recent work (Det Økonomiske Råd (2002)) it has been shown 
that a wage equation where the registered unemployment rate is replaced by an unemployment 
measure more directly related to the number of people actively searching for jobs (and also 
foreign wages), does a much better job in accounting for the wage developments. Importantly, 
this wage equation implies that passive measures withdrawing unemployed from active search 
will have detrimental effects on employment in the long run.  
 
 
                                                 
6 This includes the wage equations in the ADAM model used by the ministry of finance, the MONA model used in 
the central bank, and the SMEC model used by the Economic Council.   13 
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Note: The wage relation is a traditional Phillips curve estimated for the period 1960 to 2001 




The Danish labour market is well organized (more than 70% of the work force is a member of 
a trade union) and traditionally the labour market has been fairly centralized. 
The 1990s has also seen important changes in the institutional structure of the labour market 
with a shift from centralized towards more decentralized bargaining structures. Boeri et al. 
(2001) report an index
7 for centralization/coordination of the bargaining system taking both 
horizontal and vertical elements into account and find that it for Denmark has dropped from 
0.64 for the period 1973-77, to 0.47 for 1983-87 and 0.34 for 1993-97.  
The developments in the Danish labour market during the 1990s are, however, a challenge to 
the literature on the relation between centralization/decentralization and labour market 
performance (for a survey and references see Boeri et al. (2001)). According to the 
centralization index Denmark was ranked 4 in the 1970s and ranked 9 in the 1990s for the 15 
countries included in the study. Hence, Denmark has moved from centralized/coordinated 
bargaining to an intermediate position. According to empirical estimates reported in Boeri et 
al. (2001) this should imply an increase in the unemployment rate between 3.4 and 6.8 
percentage points. If Denmark instead is interpreted as moving from an intermediate position 
to low centralization/ coordination, the unemployment effect should be in the interval spanned 
by an increase of 3.2 percentage points and a decrease of 1.9 percentage points. Even this 
interpretation leaves some margin to the actual change in unemployment. 
A further puzzle in recent developments is that decentralization of wage formation should be 
expected to enhance the sensitivity of wages to short-run fluctuations in activity, but empirical 
evidence shows that this has not been the case, cf. above. One explanation may be that the 
                                                 
7 Defined to belong to the unit interval. A value of 1 corresponds to fully centralized and 0 to fully decentralized 
bargaining.   14 
simultaneous shift in labour market policies has reduced the outside option of workers, and 
therefore induced wage moderation, cf. e.g. Figure 6. Empirically, it is difficult to distinguish 
this trend shift in market power from the change in cyclical sensitivity over a short sample 
period 
With the increased decentralization of wage formation it is natural that there has been changes 
in wage systems in the labour market in the sense that more workers are now employed under 
a wage system allowing local and individual variations in wages and less workers are 
employed under the traditional wage system implying a centrally stipulated wage. The 
traditional wage system in Denmark has been the so-called standard pay system 
(“normallønssystem”), which fixes the wage for different categories of workers in the labour 
market for the contract period (usually two years). Historically, this system has dominated the 
labour market for unskilled workers. Various other wage systems
8 allow for a larger 
decentralized element in wage formation which either make room for personal allowances 
related to observable facts like job functions, experience, qualifications etc. or leaves the wage 
for local negotiation between the employer and employee subject to some minimum levels. 
Table 2 shows the development in the use of the various wage systems during the 1990s and 
there is a clear trend towards the use of wage systems allowing for more flexible and 
decentralized wage determination. Note that central (sector) bargaining still determines the 
wage for workers on the standard wage contract. In the past there has also been some local 
elements in wage determination showing up in the form of wage drift. 
 
 





1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 2000 
Standard 
wage 







66 81 84 84 84 85 
Sum  100 100 100 100 100 100 
Note: Wage systems with decentralized wage setting include: ”normallønssystemet”, ”minimalsystemet” og ”uden lønsats” 




Another noteworthy feature of the development during the 1990s is an increase in wage 
dispersion for workers with job functions at a high and intermediate level within firms, and 
also within business services, while no increases in wage dispersion have been observed 
among ordinary workers, cf. Figure 2. 
 
                                                 
8 The two major systems are the standard pay system (“normallønsområdet”) and the minimum wage system 
(“minimallønssystemet”). Note that the latter is not to be confused with the minimum wage. The minimum wage is 










Source: Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening (2001) 
 
With a move from centralized towards a more decentralized system of wage determination it is 
natural to expect that firm specific factors come to play a larger role for wage formation. The 
Danish labour market has historically been characterized by a fairly equal wage distribution, 
and therefore firm specific factors have previously played a minor role (although variation 
across firms have existed). Bingley and Westergaard-Nielsen (2002) include tenure among 
standard explanatory variables in estimations of individual (annual) wage equations, and use 
the estimated coefficient to construct a measure of the return-to-firm specific human capital. 
While the return-to-firm specific human capital is moderate, it is found that it has been 
increasing in recent years
9. One interpretation is that this is the outcome of the decentralization 
process making it possible for firms to use wage incentives to protect investments in firm-
specific human capital 
Another indirect approach by which to assess the importance of decentralization of wage 
formation is to exploit that wage formation is affected differently by taxation depending on 
whether the market is competitive or imperfectly competitive. While average taxes 
unambiguously increase wages under imperfect competition, they have an ambiguous effect in 
competitive markets (income vs. substitution effects). Marginal taxes would under standard 
assumptions increase wage demands in competitive markets and reduce them in imperfectly 
competitive markets. Using this insight Pedersen and Smith (1999) and Pedersen, Rasmussen 
and Clemmensen (2002) study wage formation for various groups in the labour market taking 
explicit account of the more decentralized wage formation by allowing a larger role for 
individual effects on wages. Interestingly, they find that a sample including the first part of the 
1990s tends to yield results on the effects of taxation more in line with competitive models, 
relatively to earlier studies. They take this as evidence that wage formation effectively has 
become more decentralized.  
In sum, wage formation has become more decentralized, but  the Danish experience during the 
1990s cannot simply be explained by decentralization of wage formation. This does not mean 
that decentralization is unimportant, but that it may be interacting with other important 
changes. 
                                                 
9 Though still firm-specific returns play a less important role than in e.g. the US. 
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The extent to which aggregate unemployment is driven by mismatches along dimensions like 
qualification and geography is usually addressed by considered so-called Beveridge curves. 
However, vacancy data for Denmark are of poor quality, but based on data from business 
surveys there is an indication that mis-match problems increased during the 1970s and 1980s 
since there was an increase in both vacancies and unemployment, cf. Figure 10. Judged from 






Note: Vacancies from survey data as 0.5 (proportion of firms reporting shortage of skilled workers + proportion for firms reporting shortage of 
other labour. 
Source: Danmarks Statistik 
 
Both skill and geographical aspects seem to have been of importance for mis-match problems 
in the labour market. Despite a period with high overall unemployment there has been 
substantial differences in unemployment across skill groups. In particular it does not seem that 
skill differences are lower currently than under the high unemployment period. Regular 
differences in unemployment rates for various skill groups are thus no smaller today than in 
the early 1990s, and if anything it has tended to increase. 
There is also evidence that shifts in relative labour demand have been skill-biased to the favour 
of highly skilled. Fosgerau et al. (2001) find the relative demand shift (skilled relative to 
unskilled) over the period 1980-98 to have been above 4%. Still the relative wage structure 
between skilled and unskilled has remained practically unchanged (the ratio of unskilled wages 
to the average was 90% in 1980 and 89.4% in 1998), and the unemployment rate for unskilled 
has not increased either. Hence, although the skill-bias has been as large in Denmark as in 
many other countries, the consequences have been less dramatic since the relative shift in the 
skill composition of labour demand has been matched by an almost identical change in the 
skill composition of labour supply (see Fosgerau et al. (2001)).  
Whereas there are substantial differences in unemployment rates across geographical areas (in 
2001 the unemployment rate across counties varied between 3 and 7%), various analyses have 
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found difficulties in relating geographical mobility to economic variables. Hence, mobility 
does not seem to play an important role in eliminating geographical differences in 
unemployment. Even disaggregating at skill levels there is no indication that geographical 
differences have been reduced during the recent period with falling unemployment (Det 
Økonomiske Råd, 2002). 
In the international debate it has been proposed that housing may be an impediment to mobility 
and therefore contribute to persistent unemployment problems(see Oswald (1996)). However, 
since the share of home owners is high (above 50 %), Denmark should be a country where 
housing is found to contribute to a high unemployment rate. However, empirical studies fail to 
find support for this hypothesis, if anything home-owners seem to return more quickly to work 
than others. Though, it is the case that home-owners tend to be less geographically mobile than 
tenants. This could be interpreted as evidence either of a sorting effect of entrance into home 
ownership or the fact that home owners more quickly lower their reservation demands due to 





The average tax burden in Denmark is high (in 2001 55% of GDP), and the tax structure is 
such that the bulk of revenue accrues from direct income taxation and indirect taxes (VAT). 
The total tax wedge on labour income may be a better indicator than the gross tax burden for 
the effects of taxation for the labour market. For an average worker the tax wedge is 60%, 
which is among the highest in Europe (Skatteministeriet (2002)). Progressive elements in the 
taxation system imply that the tax burden is increasing in income. A recurrent theme has been 
the disincentive effects of taxation for the labour market. This issue is complicated since the 
effects depend both on the institutional structure of the labour market as well as possibly 
counteracting substitution and income effects. In recent years focus has been on the possibility 
of reducing marginal tax rates on labour income with the aim of improving incentives for work 
including mobility in all its dimensions. 
Since about 40% of full time employed pay the top marginal tax rate, it has been a concern for 
tax reforms how to reduce marginal tax rates. A number of tax reforms have taken place in 
recent years, aiming at broadening the tax base and reducing marginal tax rates on labour 
income. Table 3 summarizes the development in marginal tax rates, and it is seen that marginal 
tax rates have been reduced, but they are still high. 
 
Table 3 Marginal tax-rates – Personal Income 
Income level (b) 1986  1993  1998  (a) 2002  (a) 
Low 48.0 50.6 45.2 44.2 
Medium  62.4 58.2 50.7 49.7 
High  73.2 68.7 62.0 63.3 
Notes: a) Inclusive labour market contributions, b) Income level is defined for the income levels applying to payment of “bundskat” , 
“mellemskat” and “topskat”. For 2002 Low income would apply for incomes below DKK 191.200, and high income for incomes above 
285.200.  
Source: Andersen et al. 2001. 
A number of recent empirical studies have considered the determinants of labour supply. It is 
in general found that the income effect is negative, and the substitution effect positive. While 
the income effect is approximately equal for men and women, the substitution elasticity (both 
the compensated and the uncompensated) is larger for women than men by factor 2 to 3. Given 
this it is possible within the existing tax system to propose tax reforms which would increase   18 
labour supply and have a non-trivial self-financing element (see e.g. Frederiksen and Hansen 
(2002) and the references therein). 
Taxation and in particular marginal taxes may affect the labour market through other routes 
than the quantity of labour supply. High marginal taxes may reduce the incentive for mobility 
both across the geographical and the skill dimension, since the private return of such mobility 
is reduced. Moreover taxation may affect wage formation and lead to higher wages. This 
relation may depend critically on the institutional arrangements concerning wage formation, 
since centralized wage setting institutions may internalise tax externalities (see Summers et al. 
(1993)). However, this would not be the case in a labour market with a more decentralized 
system of wage formation. Since Denmark has moved from a fairly centralized to a more 
decentralized system of wage formation (see above) this suggests that the distortionary 
consequences of taxation on wage formation  may increase. Empirical evidence already 
indicates that such a change is taking place (see Pedersen et al. (2002)). 
 The need for tax reform is thus a recurrent theme, and the possibility of shifting some of the 
tax burden from labour to internationally less mobile tax objects like houses and natural 
resources is often debated. 
 
6.  Labour shortage? 
 
Demographic changes are also going to affect the Danish labour market. Figure 11 shows the 
relation between the number of people aged 62 or above relative to those between 17 and 61, 
and it is seen that the demographic changes are fairly substantial within the next 30 years. 
Recent projections suggest that the labour supply would be reduced by about 2.5% from 2000 
to 2010 as a result of demographic changes. At the same time there are a number of strong 
trends reducing labour supply, namely, the trend decline in working hours (over the week and 
the year), lower labour market participation for  prime age groups and early retirement. The 
early retirement problem is particularly problematic since it is induced by a scheme 
subsidizing early retirement. Although the scheme was originally intended to provide an 
escape route for those who for physical or mental reasons have difficulty in having an ordinary 
job, it has become quite popular for large groups in the labour market as a means to enjoy 
more leisure, i.e. early retirement has become a welfare item. Recent analysis shows that 7 out 
of 10 in the scheme enter from regular work, and that 8 out of 10 have chosen early retirement 
voluntarily. The number of persons in the scheme by 2002 amounts to more than 5% of the 
labour force. The popularity of the scheme has made it difficult to reform, although there was a 
minor reform in 1998.   19 
Figure 11: Demographic shifts:
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Source: Det Økonomiske Råd (Autumn 2002) 
 
The demographic changes thus pose a challenge to the labour market, and there has been wide 
concern that shortage of labour would arise, which in turn would make it difficult to maintain 
wage developments on a path consistent with the overall macroeconomic policy strategy. 
A further challenge arises from the fact that the demographic shifts have substantial 
consequences for public finances given the way the Danish welfare model is organized. 
Various projections have been made indicating that public financed would be significantly 
affected if current standards and systems are to be maintained (Finansministeriet (2002a), Det 
Økonomiske Råd (2002), L.H. Pedersen (2002)). 
Another key issue in the Danish labour market is the poor integration of immigrants For men 
the labour force participation rate is about 20 percentage points lower than that of Danes, and 
for women it is close to 40 percentage points lower (P. Pedersen (2002)). However, analysis 
have documented that  when controlling the labour force participation for various background 
variables, it is found that the difference in labour force participation mainly can be attributed to 
lower average qualifications for immigrants (Det Økonomiske Råd (2002)). Accordingly, 
improved labour market integration would have to  go via more education, training etc., which 
raises new demands for labour market policy. 
 
7.  Concluding remarks 
The labour market developments in Denmark during the 1990s have been unique seen relative 
to the historic experience. This development cannot only be attributed to favourable 
macroeconomic conditions and a successful stabilization policy. Important institutional 
changes as well as structural policies have played an important role. 
 
The Danish labour market is adapting to a number of international trends including the 
consequences of technological developments and international integration. A skill-bias in 
labour demand have had quantitatively strong effects also on the Danish labour market but the 
consequences have been less visible since it has been accompanied by a quantitatively similar 
change in relative labour supply. The latter can partly be attributed to passive measures 
reducing labour supply, and the fact that a larger share of young generations have labour 
market relevant qualifications.  International integration may make employment more sensitive 
to wages as well as changing the outside options determining bargaining power in the labour 
market. These effects are more difficult to identify empirically but the changes in wage   20 
formation and the more decentralized wage setting institutions can be interpreted as a response 
to the challenges arising from international integration.  
The unique Danish aspect has been how to combine extended welfare arrangements with an 
incentive structure  in the labour market which does not induce rigidities and persistent high 
unemployment. Whereas policies in the past have been passive in nature with focus on income 
maintenance a number of reforms during the 1990s lead to a more active approach. While 
grossly respecting the political constraint that transfer incomes could not be reduced, they 
changed the incentive structure by reducing the possibilities for passively claiming benefits 
(stricter eligibility rules, short benefit periods etc.), and via the so-called activation policies 
obligations were attached to claiming unemployment and social benefits. It is very difficult to 
precisely quantify the contribution of the many elements in the policy reforms, but in an 
overall assessment there is no doubt that labour market structures have been changed, and this 
is an important reason for the large reduction in unemployment. However, business cycle 
developments have also played a role. 
Despite the reforms undertaken incentive problems remain. In a forward-looking perspective 
an important objective would be to increase the labour force participation (to counteract the 
effects of demographic shifts, and reduce the burden hereof for public finances) along  
especially two dimensions, namely, better integration of immigrants into the labour market and 
by creating incentives for latter retirement (where the current policies give an incentive to 
early retirement). Since especially the former involves groups which hitherto have had a more 
marginal attachment to the labour market the challenge is large. As regards early retirement the 
political constraints are also very tight since the early retirement scheme has become  a very 
popular scheme. Finally, the overall tax burden and the structure of taxation may become an 
increasingly important issue in the future. By international standards the tax burden and 
marginal taxes are high, and it is a very open question to what extent this situation is robust to 
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